By Ayodele Oni 

General Yakubu Gowon has revealed in his autobiography that serious power play happened during his ascension to the seat of Nigeria’s military Head of State.

According to him, Joseph Wey, a Commodore, and Adeyinka Adebayo, a Colonel, were senior to him and got promoted to major-general and later full-star general within one year.

“The case of Brigadier Babafemi Ogundipe was, however, not as straight forward because the course of the coup had made it obvious that he could no longer function effectively in the command-and-control structure of the Nigerian Army and the Armed Forces.

“With the concurrence of the UK government, he was appointed Nigeria’s High Commissioner to the UK,” Gowon wrote.

“Ojukwu refused my offer of friendship. By extension, he wilfully refused to recognise my leadership. 

“He felt that the ‘normal’ protocol of seniority in service should have been upheld in selecting General Ironsi’s successor under the new administration, regardless of the circumstances by which I assumed power. 

“Admiral Wey effectively persuaded former Supreme Military Council members to take cognisance of the situation and support my leadership, highlighting my ability to command respect from junior officers and my willingness to lead during a difficult time.”

Gowon did not believe Ojukwu was supporting Ogundipe or defending the army hierarchy for altruistic reasons.

He wrote: “Left unsaid at the time was Ojukwu’s strong view that I was junior to him in the hierarchy. 

“He failed to appreciate that he had been under serious threat because the young Northern officers believed he was complicit in the January 15, 1966 coup.

 “I pre-empted any attempt to move against him, in part, because of my respect for all the Regional Governors and, more importantly, because I saw him primarily as a colleague and officer with whom I thought I had worked to restore normalcy in those early days of uncertainty. 

“I believed that, together, we could rebuild the army and allow the country to continue its course in history.”

By Ayodele Oni 

Ojukwu secretly pawned Biafra’s mineral wealth to the Rothschild banking family for approximately $10m in exchange for French-backed support

Former Head of State General Yakubu Gowon (retd.) has revealed  how he managed command postings during Nigeria’s civil war.

Gowon disclosed that there was  a standoff between Obasanjo and Murtala Mohammed which he said was playing out during the opening phase of the civil war.

According to Gowon, when a young officer,  Olusegun Obasanjo, flatly refused to serve under Colonel Murtala Muhammed during the civil war, and declared that he would “never” take orders from his junior, he had to assert authority to enforce the order.

Gowon said he resolved the confrontation by invoking his authority as Commander-in-Chief and forced Obasanjo to stand down, before going on to serve as Obasanjo’s personal “guardian angel” through the war and beyond.

The revelations are contained in Chapter 14 of Gowon’s 859-page titled  “No Going Back” in his autobiography, *My Life of Duty and Allegiance*. It was presented in Abuja on Tuesday before Nigeria’s who-is-who. 

Gowon also disclosed that Biafra’s leader, Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, secretly pawned the mineral wealth of Biafra to the Rothschild banking family for approximately $10m, or an estimated N5 million at the time, in exchange for French-backed support for the secessionist effort.

Gowon said he first encountered Obasanjo at the Officers’ Mess in the United Kingdom in March 1958, when both men were undergoing officer training.

According to  Gowon, he was short of money and unable to settle his bills on arrival in London, turned to two fellow Nigerian officers, Obasanjo and a Lagos-born officer named Foluso Sotomi, to assess who might help him.

“Whereas Obasanjo was a frugal person, Sotomi was a spendthrift and, as his nickname confirmed, a typical Lagos ‘Show Boy’ who looked smarter but was more of a bigmouth and certainly more bombastic than Obasanjo.” 

When he approached Sotomi, the man had no money to spare.

“Obasanjo, on the other hand, was much different. He had more than enough money to pay for himself and to offset my initial bills. I saw that as a great display of a sense of responsibility,” the former Head of State said.

That first impression, Gowon wrote, converted into a sustained personal investment in Obasanjo’s career that would last through the civil war and into the post-war period.

He said: “That singular act made me take more interest in Obasanjo and what he did. I advised him to ensure that he remained on the right track in the Army.

“I became his informal guardian angel right up to the time I appointed him to take over the command of 3 Marine Commando from Adekunle.”

Gowon stated that he observed Obasanjo closely from the beginning, forming a clear-eyed assessment that is candid about his limitations as well as his strengths.

“Obasanjo was a quiet, respectable and intelligent officer, though not quite as smart as, for example, the younger Alani Akinrinade to whom I took instant liking whilst he was a cadet officer at my alma mater, the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst,” he wrote.

The former Head of State had decided to create a Rear Command for the newly formed 2 Division under Murtala Muhammed, with Obasanjo, then Sector Commander in the Western State, serving as Rear Commander in Ibadan, helping to organise relief supplies, equipment and reinforcements.

The arrangement would technically place Obasanjo in a supporting role under Murtala. Obasanjo, Gowon wrote, did not take it well.

“He believed he was more senior and should not be expected to serve under his junior.

“His reaction made it obvious that he was not well disposed to any idea that appeared to present him as playing second fiddle to Murtala.

“As a result, he strongly stated that he would never serve under Colonel Murtala Muhammed for any reason,” he narrated.

Gowon pointed out that Murtala’s own reaction to the arrangement similarly revealed something important about the future head of state’s character.

“His reaction also clearly showed that Obasanjo would have serious misgivings about being 2-IC even to himself,” he recalled.

But the Commander-in-Chief held firm.

“I stood my ground that, as Commander-in-Chief, I reserved the right to send people to where I believe they could be most useful to the country at any material time

“I told him his main task was not to be Murtala’s deputy, but to ensure the general security of the Western Region. He relented and took on the role assigned to him.”

Gowon added that despite the inauspicious start, Obasanjo “indeed performed well to my expectations,” specifically by rebuffing a remarkable covert attempt by Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka to use the posting to open a passage for Colonel Victor Banjo to enter the West.

“He performed well to my expectations, especially by rebuffing Wole Soyinka’s attempt to get him to allow Colonel Victor Banjo to come to the West through Benin to Ibadan. 

I deeply appreciate Obasanjo’s loyalty and sense of patriotism,” Gowon wrote.

By Ayodele Oni

More fallouts from the Nigeria civil war have emerged from the memoir of Nigeria’s helmsman during the period.

Nigeria’s Head of State at the time, General Yakubu Gowon has revealed that the then Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu who later became leader of Biafra, opposed his emergence as Head of State after the July 1966 counter-coup. Ojukwu, Gowon wrote in his autobiography preferred   Brigadier Babafemi Ogundipe, the most senior officer in the army hierarchy, to succeed the murdered Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi.

Gowon disclosed this in his memoir, “My Life of Duty and Allegiance,” presented in Abuja on Tuesday.

The former military ruler revealed that Ojukwu’s resistance to his emergence went beyond military protocol and reflected deeper tensions within the army, following the January 1966 coup and the bloody counter-coup that followed months later.

At the time Gowon assumed office, he was a lieutenant colonel and junior to several officers, including Ogundipe, Commodore Joseph Wey and Colonel Adeyinka Adebayo.

According to Gowon, Ojukwu maintained that military seniority should have determined succession after Ironsi’s assassination.

“Ojukwu refused my offer of friendship. By extension, he wilfully refused to recognise my leadership.

“He felt that the normal protocol of seniority in service should have been upheld in selecting General Ironsi’s successor under the new administration, regardless of the circumstances by which I assumed power.”

However, Gowon argued that the chaotic atmosphere created by the coup and counter-coup made Ogundipe’s emergence impractical.

“The case of Brigadier Babafemi Ogundipe was not straightforward because the course of the coup had made it obvious that he could no longer function effectively in the command-and-control structure of the Nigerian Army and the Armed Forces,” he stated.

Gowon explained that Ogundipe was later appointed Nigeria’s High Commissioner to the United Kingdom with the backing of the British government.

The former head of state also disclosed that many northern military officers believed Ojukwu was complicit in the January 1966 coup which led to the assassination of key northern political and military leaders.

Among those killed during the coup were Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Northern Premier Ahmadu Bello, Western Region Premier Ladoke Akintola and Finance Minister Festus Okotie-Eboh.

Senior northern military officers, including Brigadier Zakariya Maimalari, were also killed, fueling anger among northern troops.

Gowon revealed  that the suspicion against Ojukwu created a dangerous atmosphere after the July 1966 counter-coup, with some northern officers considering retaliatory action against the Eastern regional governor.

According to him, he personally intervened to stop any move against Ojukwu because he believed cooperation among the military leadership was necessary to stabilise the country.

“He failed to appreciate that he had been under serious threat because the young northern officers believed he was complicit in the January 15, 1966 coup.

“I pre-empted any attempt to move against him partly because of my respect for all the regional governors and because I believed we could work together to rebuild the army and restore normalcy.”

Despite Ojukwu’s refusal to recognise his authority, Gowon said he retained him as military governor of the Eastern Region in what he described as an altruistic decision.

“My decision to retain Ojukwu in office was altogether altruistic though subsequent events made it seem a huge mistake,” he wrote.

Gowon also suggested that he did not believe Ojukwu was supporting Ogundipe or defending the army hierarchy for altruistic reasons.

“Left unsaid at the time was Ojukwu’s strong view that I was junior to him in the hierarchy.

“He failed to appreciate that he had been under serious threat because the young Northern officers believed he was complicit in the January 15, 1966 coup,” he said.

Relations between both men later deteriorated as ethnic tensions escalated following reprisal killings of Igbos in northern Nigeria.

The crisis eventually culminated in May 1967 when Ojukwu declared the secession of the Eastern Region as the Republic of Biafra, triggering Nigeria’s civil war.

The war lasted for 30 months before ending in January 1970 with the surrender of Biafra and the reunification of the country.